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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 12 January 2011, a 31-foot bronze statue of Confucius, China’s most famous 
philosopher, was unveiled in Tiananmen Square. 1 Prominently displayed in front of the Chinese 
National Museum in Beijing, the statue faced both Mao Zedong’s mausoleum in the center of the 
square and his iconic portrait on the opposite side, proudly overlooking China’s political heart.  
The installation of the statue is a sign that Confucius has at long last been officially rehabilitated. 
His prime seat in China’s most sacred political space is the highest endorsement the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) could give the ancient sage—an ironic honor, considering the 
abhorrence he inspired in China’s not-so-distant Maoist past. During the Cultural Revolution, 
Confucius was seized upon as the champion of the counterrevolutionary belief system, 
associated with the oppression and social inequality of imperial China. Attacks on Confucius 
were therefore understood as attacks on the old regime, and the Anti-Lin Biao and Anti-
Confucius Campaign of the mid 1970s are remembered as some of the most violent years of the 
Cultural Revolution.2 The juxtaposition of Mao and Confucius, side-by-side in Tiananmen 
Square, the grandfatherly-looking Confucius staring into the eyes of his former persecutor, is 
thus a jarring one, almost paradoxical. However, in recent years, the CCP has increasingly 
chosen to present just such an image to the world. 
Over the past ten years, Confucianism has enjoyed a revival as the state ideology of 
China: Confucius’ unveiling in Tiananmen Square is merely the latest and greatest in a series of 
moves by the Communist party-state to incorporate the sage into the pantheon of Communist 
saints. Eager to fill the ideological vacuum left by Marxism’s fall from grace, the CCP has 
championed Confucianism as both a new national code of conduct, emphasizing tenets such as 
                                                
1 Chang, 2011 
2 Sommer, 2008, p.3 
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social responsibility and harmony, and as a symbol of national identity. The signs of this revival 
of are everywhere, from books,3 to films,4 to new construction projects.5 Within China, the 
resultant rage for “national studies” has even led to the revival of private schools called shi shu, 
where children memorize classical texts under the tutelage of teachers dressed in Han dynasty 
robes and bow to statues of Confucius.6 In large part, the Confucian revival speaks to the failure 
of Communism to provide an adequate ideological foundation for China’s continued growth. 
“The rise of a big country requires a cultural foundation, and Chinese culture upholds the spirit 
of harmony,” said Wu Weishan, the sculptor of the Tiananmen statue. “The essential thoughts of 
Confucius are love, kindness, wisdom and generosity. And peace and prosperity are what the 
people are striving for.”7 In the absence of an attractive example from more recent Communist 
history, the CCP has therefore turned to the distant past for a vision of Chinese culture that can 
inspire audiences both domestically and abroad—and has rediscovered Confucius. 
 However, it is important to note that not every cadre within the CCP is in favor of 
Confucius’ comeback. The philosopher’s occupancy of Tiananmen Square was short-lived. The 
statue was moved during the evening of April 20, 2011, with no prior announcement, from its 
prominent position in Tiananmen Square to a sculpture garden within the National Museum.8 
The statue’s removal was met with outrage from Confucius’ descendents, delight from Maoists, 
and confusion from Western observers. When reached for comment, officials stated that its 
                                                
3 Yu Dan, a professor of media studies at Beijing Normal University, at last count has sold over 4.2 million legal 
copies—and an estimated 6 million pirated versions—of her reflections on “The Analects,” which has remained a 
best seller since its publication in 2007 (Melvin, 2007). 
4 The CCP authorized the creation of a biopic commemorating the life of Confucius, ironically in celebration of the 
Party’s 60th birthday. Released in January of 2010 in the midst of tremendous hype, the state-backed biopic 
“Confucius” featured leading man Chow Yun-Fat in the title role, though the film bombed both in the box office and 
amongst critics (Bell, 2010).  
5 The newly constructed Party school in Shanghai is apparently modeled on a Confucian scholar’s desk (Bell, 2010). 
6 Melvin, 2007 
7 Chang, 2011 
8 Jacobs, 2011 
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position overlooking Tiananmen Square had always been considered to be temporary, until it 
could be moved to the sculpture garden. However, considering the official ceremony the statue 
received at its unveiling, this explanation seems unlikely.9 Instead, the sudden removal of the 
statue suggests a behind-the-scenes political decision. Older cadres from within the conservative 
faction likely saw the statue’s orientation across from Mao as a quiet challenge to Marxist 
orthodoxy, and therefore to the Party itself.   
Given the clear ambivalence within the Party and divided feelings amongst Communist 
leadership about the scope of the Confucian revival, why does it continue to press on? There are 
as many compelling reasons to suppress the revival of Confucianism as to promote it: as Cheng 
Li, an analyst at the Brookings Institute, says, Confucianism “is such a big basket you can select 
whatever you want.”10 While the Party can invoke Confucian harmony and filial piety in hopes 
of greater social order and respect for authority, political dissidents can just as easily point to its 
progressive humanism in their demands for responsible government and ethical leadership. And 
so, while some commentators explain the revival of Confucianism as a purely anti-democratic 
move by the CCP—yet another attempt to encourage deference to Party rule—this explanation 
seems too simplistic in light of the potential risks posed by the very same doctrine. 
 It is certainly true that the CCP has revived Confucius, at least in part, for a Chinese 
audience. In the face of widespread public cynicism regarding traditional Communist ideology, 
particularly since Tiananmen, the Party has been searching for an alternative philosophical 
tradition for the past two decades. Confucianism can appeal to the public without contradicting 
the Party’s continuing use of official Marxist theories on politics and social development. It also 
                                                
9 Dotson, 2011, p. 13 
10 Yee, 2011 
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promotes social stability domestically, urging the public to remain calm and loyal despite rising 
income inequality, environmental pollution, and official corruption. 
 However, what this explanation ignores is that there is an international dimension to the 
resurgence of equal importance. In many ways, the revival of Confucius appears to be largely for 
foreign consumption, a way to reassure nervous international observers of China’s good 
intentions as it continues to grow. While Mao Zedong remains a controversial figure in the West, 
reviled for the famine, poverty, and political oppression that marked Maoist China, Confucius is 
seen as grandfatherly, wise, and above all, respectable. The CCP hopes that by presenting a 
Confucian China to the world, they can harness that respectability to improve their national 
image and smooth over negative perceptions of China abroad. Indeed, in this light the installation 
of Confucius in Tiananmen Square takes on added significance. Tiananmen has been the subject 
of international scrutiny since the events of 1989; the placement of Confucius in a place 
irrevocably tied with violence in the Western consciousness can therefore be interpreted as an 
attempt to superimpose a new, peaceful gloss on the square’s bloody history. 
It seems at least one element of the state-led revival of Confucianism is thus an attempt to 
put a positive spin on China’s rise in the eyes of foreign observers. The rise of the Chinese 
popular nationalist movement since the 1990s, aggressive, confrontational, and sometimes anti-
Western, has negatively influenced popular opinion abroad and contributed to Western fears that 
China’s rise—already an unsettling concept for many—poses a threat to global stability and 
peace. The development of the Confucian-influenced discourse of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful 
development” is thus part of a broad, international propaganda campaign to describe China’s rise 
in a non-threatening terms. Although the CCP has certainly been motivated by domestic 
concerns in the revival of Confucianism, the key factor in Confucius new role as the avuncular 
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symbol of Chinese culture is the Western conviction of a “China threat”: the invocation of 
Confucian themes in the discourse of “harmony” or “peaceful rise” is therefore an attempt to 
rebrand China abroad as a responsible and harmonious world power.  
I begin this paper with an overview of the origin of the popular Confucian revival as well 
as various scholarly perspectives on the motivation for the state-led movement. Next, I will 
discuss the negative perceptions of China in the West as well as the rationale for the China threat 
theory, particularly how both are influenced by Chinese nationalism. I will then describe the 
patriotic education campaign of the 1990s and its role in rise of popular nationalism, arguing that 
the ability of Chinese nationalists to exert pressure on the party-state has had severe negative 
consequences for China’s national image. Finally, I will discuss China’s Confucian image 
adjustment through the development of the CCP approved discourses of the “harmonious 
society” and “peaceful rise,” pointing to conspicuous examples of the new “Confucian China” as 
packaged for audiences abroad. I will close with an evaluation of the potential consequences of 
the revival. 
 
STATE-LED CONFUCIANISM 
 
First I should be clear on what I mean by “Confucian revival.” In this paper, the 
Confucian revival refers to the resurgence in the popularity of Confucian ideals within the last 
decade amongst the official narratives of the CCP—or, at least, the promotion of a very selective 
interpretation of the Confucian tradition by the Party. While this paper addresses the state’s role 
in the Confucian revival, there is a popular movement that exists parallel to the state-led variety, 
and it is important to distinguish between the two. The popular movement developed from the 
bottom-up out of the socio-economic conditions of reform and opening, gaining momentum in 
the 1990s among Chinese intellectuals disillusioned with the West. As this disillusionment grew, 
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intellectuals began to rediscover the values of traditional Chinese culture and develop a new 
ideology that drew selectively from this legacy.11 Chinese intellectuals have thus been 
experimenting with Confucianism for at least two decades. In comparison, the state-led revival 
seems somewhat belated. Engineered by Party elites from the top-down, state-led Confucianism 
did not take off until 2005, when President Hu Jintao first invoked Confucius in a speech, 
declaring “Confucius said, Harmony is something to be cherished.” Rather than led by 
intellectuals, the state-led revival reflects the Party’s concerns—that is, harmony and peace—and 
is mostly propagandic. This resurgence is therefore nothing new. Confucianism has experienced 
a popular revival for decades. The question is why does this newest, state-led wave come so late?  
To answer this, we can turn to the literature. Scholars have studied the official 
rehabilitation of Confucius with interest and have offered a variety of explanations for the 
revivalists’ goals. Some scholars see the revival as a conservative reaction against 
Westernization. Theodore de Bary argues that those disposed to the revival see Confucianism as 
a bulwark against unwanted change. Revivalists seek to preserve the status quo, and 
Confucianism is invoked as a symbol of traditional values, which are equated with stability and 
continuity in the face of modernity and change.12 Likewise, Suisheng Zhao argues that 
Confucianism is invoked as insulation from the “spiritual pollution” of the West, pointing to the 
de-romanticization of the West among Chinese intellectuals in the 1990s for the revival’s 
origin.13 
Other scholars see the revival as a response to social unrest. Particularly, they look to the 
increasing popularity of the Confucian concept of datong, or the Grand Harmony, as a evidence 
of the lack of harmony in Chinese society. Shiping Hua points to the problems created by 
                                                
11 Zhao, 1997, p. 737  
12 De Bary, 1984, p. 8 
13 Zhao, 1997, p. 730  
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unbridled materialism, the widening gap between rich and poor, and widespread political 
corruption. He argues that the Confucian ideal of the Grand Harmony, with its emphasis on the 
collective good, fills the spiritual void in a society from which social responsibility has 
disappeared and each person pursues their happiness at the expense of others.14 Confucius is thus 
invoked to promote order and stability amongst an increasingly dissatisfied populace.  
Alternatively, a third group of scholars see the revival as a response to calls for political 
liberalization. They argue that, in the face of mounting pressure from the West and the increasing 
number of domestic agitators, Confucian benevolence and meritocracy are being presented as 
alternatives to Western liberal democracy. In the same way that capitalism and communism 
coexist in the economic sphere, modern day Confucians like Daniel Bell envision democracy and 
Confucianism together in the political sphere.15 However, Neil A. Eaglehart argues that the 
selective application of cultural relativism, such as arguments for unique “Asian Values” or 
“Confucian Ethics,” are the result of political reasons rather than a reflection of traditional 
mores.16 By appealing to Confucius and traditional Chinese values of “harmony” and “stability,” 
the CCP hopes to put a democratic veneer on its activities and lend academic respectability to 
their vision of “democracy with Chinese characteristics.”17 
While these interpretations are very different, a common thread runs through these 
arguments, and that is that the Confucian revival is mainly a reactionary response with primarily 
a domestic audience in mind. These arguments don’t seriously consider how the international 
environment might have played a role in Confucius’ rehabilitation, which is ironic considering 
                                                
14 Hua, 2005, p. 67 
15 Bell, 1999, p. 465  
16 Eaglehart, 2000, p. 554 
17 It is important to note that “democracy with Chinese characteristics” is not really democracy at all: the Party has 
repeatedly stated that Western Democracy isn’t suitable for China. A Confucian alternative is thus proposed as a 
compromise, whereby a benevolent—though authoritarian—leader rules on behalf of the people in order to achieve 
the benefits of democracy while bypassing inefficient and “culturally inappropriate” democratic processes. 
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that the revival has grown with China’s increased openness to the international community. 
Some of the most significant moments in the revival have had a conspicuously international 
orientation: the choice to present a Confucian China to the world during the Beijing Olympics, 
the installation of a statue of Confucius in Tiananmen Square, the foundation of Confucian 
Institutes abroad to spread Chinese language and culture, and the creation of The Confucius 
Peace Prize as a Party approved alternative to the Nobel Peace Prize. The outwardly focused 
nature of the Confucian revival seems to suggest that there is an international thrust to this 
campaign of at least equal, if not greater, importance. The CCP thus actively invokes Confucian 
themes as it projects its power abroad, hoping the rhetoric of harmony and peace will calm 
Western fears of China. 
 
“THE CHINA THREAT” 
 
“Sweetie, are you having nightmares about the Chinese again?”  
—Cartman’s mother to her son, in an October 2008 episode of South Park that begins with 
Cartman frightened by a dream of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. 
 
While it may seem ridiculous, a funny gag for a late night television show, Cartman’s 
attitude reflects the attitude of a large number of Americans. The majority of people in Western 
countries view China’s rise with a mixture of suspicion and fear. A 2011 BBC World Service 
poll reveals that the number of people who view China’s increasingly powerful economy with 
unease has grown substantially since 2005, especially amongst China’s key trading partners. 
Likewise, when asked how they would feel if “China becomes more powerful militarily than it is 
today,” 59% of those surveyed Western countries responded negatively, with only 24% 
expressing positive feelings.18 A recent Pew global attitudes survey reports similar findings: 
 
                                                
18 BBC World Service, 2011 
Gary 10 
“In 32 of 46 countries surveyed, China's increasing military muscle is viewed 
with alarm. These worries are most prevalent in two countries with a long and 
sometimes bitter historic connection to China: South Korea, where fully 89% 
view Chinese military might as a bad thing and Japan where 80% share that 
view.”19 
 
The same survey reports that overall attitudes have soured as well, with the largest declines 
among China’s major neighbors (Japan, South Korea, and India) and Western Europe (Britain, 
France, Germany, and Spain). Yet another survey from the Pew Research Center reports that 
20% of Americans now identify China when asked to name the country representing the greatest 
threat to the US, compared to 12% answering Iran, 10% answering Afghanistan, and less than 
10% answering Iraq.20  
 American pundits fuel popular fears of a rising China. This is perhaps best represented by 
Bill Gertz, Washington Times columnist and leader of the conservative “Blue Team,” a group of 
journalists, analysts, and politicians loosely unified by their mutual belief that China represents a 
threat to US national security. 21 Gertz and his colleagues attack “panda huggers” as capitulators 
who distract from the reality of the Chinese threat, disguising the evil dragon as a cute panda at 
the expense of American preparedness.22  Gertz’s paranoia in his 2000 book, The China Threat: 
How the People’s Republic Targets America, both reflect widespread American suspicions about 
Chinese intentions and serves to deepen them. Fellow dragon-slayer William Triplett, coauthor 
of Year of the Rat and Red Dragon Rising and a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, argues that China is determined to challenge the United States for supremacy and 
                                                
19 Kohut, 2007 
20 Pew Research Center, 2011 
21 Coined by William Triplett, former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the name refers to the 
color of US forces (blue) in war games, as opposed to the red that represents American opponents (Gertz, 2000, p. 
46). 
22 Gries, p. 2 
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urges Americans to fight for democracy and freedom from China’s “dictatorial regime.”23  
 The Western media often echoes these dark sentiments. Foreign correspondents stationed 
in Beijing, habitually harassed by government officials, often focus on the negative side of life in 
China: corruption, censorship, and confinement.24 While there is truth to this portrayal—perhaps 
especially for journalists, who face more difficulties and dangers in China than almost any other 
profession—it is just one side to the truth in one of the most diverse and complicated countries in 
the world. Alone, it is an oversimplification that leads to a very negative depiction of China in 
the West. Below is a cartoon by Morten Morland from The Times that depicts China as a dragon, 
wreathed in fire, terrorizing the rest of the world.25  
 
                                                
23 Gries, p. 3 
24 Journalist Johnathan Watts wrote in an article for the Foreign Correspondents Club of China, “China, I suspect, 
sometimes gets more negative coverage than it deserves because its old system of restricting the activities of foreign 
correspondents pushes them into taking sides. To do a sensitive story in the provinces, journalists used to have to 
choose between going officially and getting an overly rosy view of what was happening, or sneaking in without 
permission and hearing only the views of disgruntled peasants…Forced to choose, most journalists often gave the 
benefit of the doubt to the little guy up against the system” (Watts, 2008). 
25 Morland, 2009 
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The United States, represented by Uncle Sam, is tangled in the dragon’s coils and waving an 
IOU fan in surrender, representing the American government’s dependence on China as its 
banker. The British bulldog is kept at bay with a single claw and former Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh is easily shoved out of the picture; meanwhile, the Dalai Lama is kept prisoner 
in the dragon’s claws. The Copenhagen climate deal is shown torn in half by the dragon’s scales, 
while golden pendants hang around the dragon’s neck, symbolizing both China’s wealth and its 
exploitation of Africa. Most importantly, though easy to miss in the bottom right corner, the 
dragon holds the world tightly within its sharp talons. Overall, the picture painted is a grim one, 
in which a colossal China crowds out potential competition, squeezes the last drops of usefulness 
from a failing former power, and cruelly silences dissent. This style of depiction of China is 
fairly typical—the Chinese state as an ill-tempered dragon, presiding over a land of oppression, 
preparing to further spread its sinister coils over the rest of the world—and reflects the most 
ominous of Western fears concerning the rise of China. 
What is it about China that makes its continued growth so frightening to Western 
observers? On one level, the international community always fears the rise of a new nation to 
prominence because of the way this upsets the status quo. Traditional analyses predict that the 
rise of a great power by nature signifies a threat to international security: as one power rises, 
another is displaced, resulting in tension, distrust, and conflict as the newcomer uses its newly 
gained power to force its national interests.26 Further, as an authoritarian state, China faces an 
extra level of scrutiny and suspicion from liberal democratic countries. However, the fear that 
surrounds “the China Threat” seems to be more than just than a fear of a changing international 
order. India is growing at a similarly impressive rate, and yet its rise is viewed as a more benign 
                                                
26 Ikenberry, 2008 
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event—at least the “rise of India” does not inspire the same media frenzy,27 perhaps because of 
India’s status as a fellow democracy. Likewise, although the democracies of the world might 
wish for the PRC to liberalize, there is little threat that Chinese politics might spread to the West, 
even at the most pessimistic analysis. This extra measure of China fear mongering can thus be 
explained by the rise of Chinese popular nationalism. Views of China as a threat to global 
security stem from Western perceptions of China as an irrational actor, the result of the highly 
emotional, highly aggrieved popular nationalist movement and increased saber rattling from the 
Chinese state itself. 
As the policies of reform and opening began to take hold during the 1980s, the 
ideological vacuum created by the failure of communism forced the CCP to turn elsewhere for 
legitimacy. Re-establishing itself as the paramount patriotic force and the protector of national 
pride, Party officials actively promoted nationalist themes in the 1990s in order to encourage 
loyalty to the CCP. On one had, this nationalism has helped Beijing’s national image within 
China by reinforcing its legitimacy, quieting potential dissidence, and diverting public attention 
from domestic problems to foreign enemies. On the other hand, the rise of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism has complicated China’s relations with both its neighbors in the region and the West. 
The “victim” mentality of Chinese popular nationalists in regard to Western powers has led to 
hypersensitivity in issues of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, resulting in indignant 
demands for respect from other nations and a return to China’s former greatness. The growth of 
popular nationalism and its influence over Chinese foreign policy has played a significant role in 
                                                
27 An 30 April 2012 Google search of “rise of China” returns 8,940,000 results, compared to 569,000 results for 
“rise of India.” The top results for each search are very revealing of the general tone of the coverage that each 
nation’s growth inspires: the top result for China is a New York Times page entitled “China Threat” or a “Peaceful 
Rise of China,” while the top result for India is a Foreign Affairs page that in its first sentence describes India as a 
“roaring capitalist success story.” Overall, the Western media seems to be more suspicious of China’s growth than 
of India’s. 
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shaping the Western fears and in the articulation of the China Threat. As the grumbling of 
disgruntled youth is given weight by the acknowledgement and attention of the CCP, which is 
bound to honor nationalist sentiment in order to protect its legitimacy, China’s image as a mature 
and responsible world power is necessarily damaged. In this light, the Confucian revival can be 
considered an attempt to demonstrate China’s commitment to maintaining harmonious relations 
with its neighbors to the world, despite the agitation of nationalists. 
 
Patriotic education and the rise of popular nationalism 
 
 In the wake of reform and opening, the CCP found itself confronted by a profound 
spiritual crisis,28 largely the result of the social dislocation that accompanied reform and opening: 
as economic reforms became progressively market-oriented, the official ideology began to lose 
its credibility. The departure from the Marxist political discourse and the growing awareness of 
economic inequality, led many Chinese to become increasingly disillusioned in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. With rapid decay of communist ideology and the growing possibility of a 
regime crisis, the Party leadership began to search for an alternate source of legitimacy for its 
governance in China, and eventually settled on nationalism as a possible solution. While 
communism had become stale in the face of growing materialism and ideological 
disillusionment, nationalism remained deeply engrained in the Chinese political consciousness 
throughout reform and opening. The former greatness of imperial China and its humiliation at 
the hand of Western imperialists is such an important national myth to the modern Chinese state 
that it has become cliché.29 Most Chinese, even the most vehement anti-traditionalists,30 
                                                
28 Known as the “three belief crisis” (sanxin weiji), it was comprised of a crisis of faith in socialism (xinxin weiji), 
crisis of belief in Marxism (xinyang weiji), and crisis of trust in the Party (xinren weiji) (S. Zhao, 1998, p.248). 
29 China’s “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi) refers to the period of subjugation China suffered under foreign 
imperialists, both Western and Japanese. Its genesis is typically dated to the First Opium War between Great Britain 
and the Qing Dynasty in the mid-nineteenth century, during which Great Britain smuggled opium illegally into the 
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desperately yearned for the re-emergence of China as a world power. By redefining reform and 
opening as a nationalistic campaign for Chinese greatness, the CCP could more easily justify its 
departure from socialist goals like equality. Nationalism was thus looked to provide the spiritual 
content to fill the void left by the decline of Communism.  
 Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese state thus systematically encouraged patriotism and 
nationalist sentiment in its student population with a campaign of “patriotic education” 
(aiguozhuyi jiaoyu). The purpose of the campaign was to educate youths in Chinese tradition and 
history, national conditions, and the nationalist legacy of the CCP in order to inculcate nationalist 
resentment against foreign pressures, past and present, simultaneously emphasizing the Party’s 
role as the ultimate protector of Chinese national interests. By emphasizing China’s repeated 
victimization at the hands of the imperialists, the Party sought to encourage a more critical view 
of the West, hoping to neutralize the political threat posed by increased globalization. The 
portrayal of a Western siege of China and the formation of an” anti-China club,” headed by 
politicians in Washington, would also serve to divert protest away from the Party and towards 
external sources. As result, sovereignty and territorial integrity have become major themes in 
Chinese nationalism, with special attention paid to the historical incursions of foreigners and 
their interference in China’s domestic affairs. In the context of this new narrative, international 
condemnation of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown could be portrayed to the public as a Western 
attack on the Chinese political system, China’s failed bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games an 
anti-China plot constructed by the West, the campaign for international human rights as lies 
                                                                                                                                                       
country in hopes that the resulting addiction would forcibly pry open the formerly exclusive Chinese market, and 
ends with the expulsion of the Japanese by Communist forces in 1945. 
30 Anti-traditionalism is a school of Chinese intellectual thought that sees traditional Chinese culture as the major 
source of Chinese backwardness and therefore the reason for China’s repeated failures to modernize. The anti-
traditionalists reject traditional Confucian culture, values, and norms and seek for their eradication in favor of 
Western technical knowledge, whose adoption will make China strong (S. Zhao, 2000, pp. 7-9). 
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meant to disgrace China internationally, the promotion of intellectual property rights an attempt 
to halt Chinese economic development.31 While patriotic education was not necessarily intended 
to create animosity towards the West, it was intended to raise suspicion of Western “universal 
values,” such as democracy and free speech, and the supposed benefit of such principles for 
China. By portraying foreign powers as self-interested and even antagonistic towards China, the 
CCP is able to assert its own interpretation of international conflicts and cry foul whenever the 
West’s doesn’t match. 
While invocation of nationalism may have saved the CCP from regime crisis, this has 
come at a cost. The move towards a deeper engagement with history begun by patriotic 
education has led to a heightened awareness of the trauma of China’s past. The result has been an 
exacerbation of popular feelings of external siege and persecution from the Western world. 
These passionate feelings of anger serve as the “psychic fuel”32 behind the more virulent forms 
of popular nationalism. By creating a dichotomy between China and the West, emphasizing the 
humiliations of history and the modern “siege” China faces from the Western world, the CCP has 
created an environment supportive of radical nationalist expression.  
This radicalization has had serious consequences for China’s relations with foreign 
powers. The young nationalists of the fourth generation, known as fenqing or “angry youth,”33 
care very much about relations with Taiwan, Tibet, Japan, and the United States and their 
belligerent attitude towards these issues makes diplomatic negotiations difficult for the Party. 
Since the Party has based its legitimacy on its nationalist inheritance and its role as the protector 
of the national interest, it must be responsive to nationalist feeling within the country. This 
complicates foreign relations, sometimes forcing the CCP to take a more aggressive stance on 
                                                
31 S. Zhao, 1998, p. 297 
32 Gries, 2004, p. 11 
33 Osnos, 2008 
Gary 17 
issues than it may otherwise like—or at least to take precautions against appearing overly 
conciliatory. Compromise with foreign powers thus comes at the risk of the Party appearing 
unpatriotic, a perception that undermines the nationalist legitimacy it has worked so long to 
develop.  
However, China’s aggressive stance towards the West has not gone unobserved, and the 
high profile belligerence of Chinese nationalists has been a major contributing factor to popular 
fears of the “China Threat.” This is not just a fear of wild-eyed youth, however. There is real fear 
in the West of the implications of the rise of popular nationalism in China. Too often, 
commentators mistake the sentiments of Chinese nationalists as merely “party propaganda,” 
ignoring the role that people and their passions play in the further development of this 
movement. While it is true that the CCP party-state has played a large role in creating a hyper 
nationalistic environment in China today, its involvement in its creation does not make the 
aggrieved feelings of nationalists any less real. At best, nationalism is a method of control and 
the Chinese state doesn’t share the anger of its people; we are still left with a movement out of 
control, one that the Party must appease with real action to maintain its legitimacy. As Peter 
Hays Gries cautions, “Western policy makers should…recognize that because the Party’s 
legitimacy now depends upon accommodating popular nationalist demands, the Foreign Ministry 
must take popular opinion into account as it negotiates foreign policy.”34 So long as the Chinese 
people demand a say in nationalist politics, it must be acknowledged that the fate of the nation is 
no longer the Party’s exclusive province. 
The consequence of this tenuous balance is something more serious than the rumblings of 
discontented youth, and causes Western observers to look with added suspicion to Chinese 
movements abroad. For example, the shadow cast by Chinese nationalism gives darker 
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reverberation to concerns in the West over the Chinese military buildup. China’s defense budget 
will double by 2015, making it more than the rest of the Asia Pacific region’s combined. 
Beijing’s military spending will reach $238.2 billion in 2015, compared with $232.5 billion for 
rest of the region. That would also be almost four times the expected defense budget of Japan, 
the next biggest in the region, in 2015.35 Likewise, in this light, China’s continued disputes in the 
South China Sea take on added significance.36 The wave of rising Chinese nationalism has 
prompted Beijing’s recent attempts to recover territory it claims was taken when the country was 
weak. China maintains its “undisputable sovereignty” over as much as 80% of the South China 
Sea, including territory claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.37 In 
fact, Chinese leaders have stated that the South China Sea is an area of “core national interest,” 
on par with Tibet and Taiwan. The implications of this statement are enough to give pause to 
concerned observers: China has reserved the right to use force to establish national unity in the 
vehemently contested region. With the PRC loudly rattling the sword at its borders, the rising 
cries of the angry youth represent a larger threat: the CCP must respond to nationalist demands in 
order to maintain its legitimacy, and such examples are evidence of its ability—and suggest its 
apparent willingness—to follow through. 
At worst, however, Party leaders share in the humiliation of Chinese nationalists—and 
their desire for vengeance. China does appear to be testing its power, flexing its growing 
muscles. While it might be comforting to view states as rational actors, it is important to 
remember that politicians and policy makers are people too, vulnerable to the same passions. 
Factionalism within the CCP makes it particularly difficult to divine the Party’s motives: is the 
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Party performing for a domestic audience, exhibiting, in its aggressive stance, its national 
strength? Or does nationalist posturing reveal something more sinister at work? This paper does 
not pretend to have an answer to this question, and in some ways it does not matter, since the 
CCP’s nationalist obligations seem both as able and equally likely to lead to conflict as any 
purposeful maneuver. Either way, the aggrieved tone of Chinese nationalism and the rising 
influence of popular nationalists have contributed to the fear of a China threat and a negative 
national image abroad.  
 
The consequences of popular nationalism on national image 
 
 Each day, some thirty-five hundred Chinese citizens are going online for the first time.38 
With a rapidly growing number of domestic Internet users, the web has become an increasingly 
popular gathering place for Chinese nationalists. Chinese cybernationalism has focused on 
foreign policy issues such as China’s relationship with Taiwan, the future of Tibet, and Sino-
Japanese relations—a perennial hot topic. Cybernationalists have also found themselves 
particularly moved by perceived slights to China by Western powers, such as NBC’s coverage of 
the 1996 Olympics, the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the 
collision of a Chinese F-8 fighter with an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South 
China Sea in 2001. These exchanges between Chinese “netizens” and the rest of the world have 
had a powerful impact on China’s international image. Barred from free expression and political 
participation in real life, Chinese nationalists often compensate online with added vehemence. 
Shielded by the anonymity of the Internet, cybernationalists express their opinions with a violent 
passion that both offends and worries Western observers. Extreme forms of online nationalism 
directly sabotage Beijing’s desired national image as a peaceful and responsible rising power.  
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 For example, in April 2008, Grace Wang, a Chinese freshman at Duke University, found 
herself the target of online persecution. Branded as a “race traitor” after trying to separate a 
group of pro-Tibet from pro-China protestors on campus, her picture and personal information 
appeared online in a forum for Chinese students. 39 Wang became the subject of heated, personal 
attacks and received emails threatening her with death should she return to China. “Call the 
human flesh search engines!”40 one user threatened, calling for physical, as opposed to virtual, 
action.41 Internet users dug up her address in China and vandalized her home, forcing Wang’s 
mother into hiding. The unnecessary violence of this response contributes to perceptions of 
China as defensive, hypersensitive, and childishly vindictive. New York Times columnist 
Nicholas D. Kristof captured the American reaction to Wang’s story well, sighing that this is the 
kind of incident that makes Western observers so uneasy about rising Chinese nationalism:  
 
“[This] kind of Internet bullying seems more common in China — there have 
been many such cases — than in most other countries, and it has shades of the 
Cultural Revolution in it: The mob of crazed students clinging blindly to an 
ideology, denouncing a cosmopolitan intellectual as a “stinking No. 9″ and 
demanding that he or she repent to the crowd. This kind of nationalism is 
blinding, just as Maoism was in 1967, and it’s not good for China or for the 
world. And those fiery nationalists are doing far more damage to China’s image 
around the world than a million Grace Wangs could ever have done.”42 
 
Such stunts compromise Beijing’s attempts to portray a confident and self-assured rising power 
to the international community. Likewise, this image of hypersensitivity also causes Western 
audiences to question China’s ability to provided international leadership: if China is unwilling 
to open itself to dialogue, how will it manage the responsibilities of a global power?   
 Chinese nationalists assemble offline as well, sometimes resulting in violent protests. In 
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1999, after NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese people, tens 
of thousands of protestors—mainly students and youth—took to the streets in what later became 
known as the “May 8th” protests, throwing bricks, rocks, garbage, and Molotov cocktails. The 
rioters kept US Ambassador Jim Sasser and his staff trapped in the American embassy for days, 
shouting slogans like “Blood for blood!” and burning American flags.43 Students organized 
boycotts of American goods, targeting American-owned businesses like McDonalds by calling 
for the government to “Kick American hamburgers out of China!”44 The Party at first implicitly 
encouraged protestors, constructing web pages devoted to protesting the Belgrade bombing and 
publishing confrontational articles, like this op-ed from The People’s Daily: 
 
“This is 1999, not 1989…China is a China that has stood up; it is a China that 
defeated the Japanese fascists; it is a China that had a trial of strength and won 
victory over the United States on the Korean battleground. These Chinese people 
are not to be bullied, and China’s sovereignty and dignity are not to be violated. 
The hot blood of people of ideas and integrity who opposed imperialism for over 
150 years flows in the veins of the Chinese people. U.S.-led NATO had better 
remember this.”45 
   
The US media was shocked by the Chinese reaction. Unable to understand its strength, they 
quickly directed the blame at the Chinese government, who they accused of inflaming the 
passions of protestors. A review of editorials from 11 May by Peter Hays Gries reveals that most 
major US newspapers believed government propaganda was to blame for the mistaken view 
within China that the bombing was intentional, and that the Chinese people were not genuinely 
angry. The San Francisco Chronicle maintained that Beijing had “failed to tell its citizens that 
the US attack was an accident and that President Clinton has apologized to Beijing.” The 
Washington Post echoed this sentiment, announcing “the Big Lie is alive and well in Beijing” 
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while the Boston Globe accused the Party of orchestrating displays of “state-approved anger.”46 
While Gries denies these interpretations, the violence of the anti-American nationalist backlash 
was seized upon by the majority of Western commentators as proof of the Communist menace, 
evidence of an emerging China threat. 
 Violent displays of nationalism, both online and off, affect both China’s domestic stability 
and international image. From the perspective of already suspicious observers in the West, the 
quickness with which nationalists turn criticism into slight, their conviction that Western powers 
deliberately deny China “face,” and their propensity for overreaction all serve to discredit 
China’s claim to a “peaceful rise.” Minxin Pei argues that the aggrieved tone of Chinese 
nationalism damages China’s image as a responsible stakeholder, arguing “a very nationalistic 
public makes foreigners very wary of China and harms China’s image.”47  
 While some observers accuse Beijing of consciously harnessing popular nationalism as a 
way to counter elements of Western political values, still more worrying is the idea that the 
movement is organic, genuine, and beyond the control of the CCP. While a certain percentage of 
angry youth is reasonable—perhaps even beneficial for a country still battling with injustice—
the thought that the management of China could be handed over to them is horrifying.48 Susan 
Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs under President Bill Clinton, has 
explored this potentiality, arguing that the combination of China's growing military and growing 
popular nationalism present concrete dangers: “It creates the risk, not a high probability, but a 
risk, that one day China's leaders could feel that to look strong in the eyes of their public they 
have to make a threat to Japan or to Taiwan and that they will feel that they cannot back down 
from that threat without jeopardizing their own domestic support or even their own survival in 
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power.”49 This uncomfortable balance of power thus informs Western perceptions of China as an 
unpredictable and potentially irrational actor, a perception that complicates the party-state’s 
foreign policy dealings. 
A state’s reputation can have real consequences in terms of its relations with other states: 
a state that projects a tough and aggressive image may be interpreted by other international 
actors as potentially threatening or as less willing to cooperate. These interpretations can have 
serious consequences for that state’s foreign policy goals. A judgment of a state’s character, 
national image is used to predict future behavior.50 Robert Keohane argues “the most important 
aspect of an actor’s reputation in world politics is the belief of others that it will keep its future 
commitments even when a particular situation, myopically viewed, makes it appear 
disadvantageous to do so.”51 Developing and maintaining a positive national image becomes an 
important task for all states in order to work effectively with other international actors and 
achieve its foreign policy goals.  
National image is also an important dimension of national power. Harvard political 
scientist Joseph Nye argues that the subtler power that comes from attraction, otherwise known 
as soft power, is a more cost effective way to lead:  
“A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other 
countries admire its values, emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity 
and openness. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you 
want—co-opts people rather than coerces them.”52 
 
A state’s soft power, Nye contends, rests on three major resources: its culture, its political values, 
and its foreign polices.53 As a result, a state with an attractive culture, appealing political values, 
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and persuasive foreign policy can more effectively achieve its international goals: if a country 
can present an attractive culture or ideology to the international community, more people will 
willingly follow; if people are willing to follow, the country can shape international norms and 
values in ways that benefit its own interests with less suspicious or resistance.54 Therefore, 
national image matters. By cultivating a positive or attractive national image, states have access 
to a wider range of options in wielding their national power. In contrast, a state with a negative 
national image will constantly find itself constrained, struggling against the low expectations of 
the international community and contained by suspicion.  
The conviction of the dragon slayers of the West in the existence of a “China Threat” is 
therefore partially the result of a negative national image, and by extension poor national image 
management. This negative national image affects China’s relationship with other international 
powers, and thus its ability to conduct effective foreign policy. As China continues to develop, it 
has a greater capacity to pursue its national interests. However, if every flexing muscle is met 
with cries of alarm from the international community, its power is necessarily constrained. The 
problems for China’s national image posed by the aggression of many Chinese nationalists have 
thus created the need for an international campaign to revitalize the Chinese “brand.” In response 
to Western accusations of a “China threat,” China’s Former Director of State Council 
Information Office, Zhu Muzhi, has said,  
“Some (foreign countries) have prejudices or have wrongly believed rumors, 
therefore what they think about China is not the true image of China. We will try 
every means to present a comprehensive and real picture of China to the outside 
world so that you can see the true image of China.”55  
 
Indeed, in recent years Western governments have called on China to do just that: 
reassure the international community of its intentions. “Just as we and our allies must 
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make clear that we are prepared to welcome China's arrival as a prosperous and 
successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and 
growing global role will not come at the expense of the security and well-being of 
others,” said James Steinberg, former US Deputy Secretary of State.56 Therefore, in order 
to calm nervous observers in the West, Beijing’s top priority has been to maintain peace 
at home while continuing to take a greater role in international affairs. By rebranding 
China as a Confucian China, the CCP hopes to superimpose the image of harmony and 
peace over its aggrieved nationalist movement and recast the People’s Republic as a 
smiling panda in place of a snarling dragon. 
 
THE CONFUCIAN REVIVAL  
 
The Harmonious Society and peaceful rise 
 
The new, state-led revival of Confucianism was initiated by President Hu Jintao who 
began to emphasize the importance of harmony in response to increasing social tension. He first 
invoked the ancient sage in a February 2005 speech to the National Congress, declaring, 
“Confucius said, Harmony is something to be cherished.”57 Since then, the concept of harmony, 
or hexie, has become central to the Party’s social discourse, as the mantra for both domestic and 
foreign policy. The idea of harmony is the key feature in China’s brand management, and is used 
to paint a picture of a peaceful China. Official propaganda looks beyond the tumultuous present, 
past the violent chaos of the Communist period, and back to a harmonious golden age in China’s 
imperial past where sage kings ruled with wisdom and benevolence. 
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The state-led revival of Confucianism is tied closely to the Party’s official narrative of a 
“Harmonious Society” (Hexie Shehui).58 Although first introduced in 2005, not long after Hu’s 
first public flirtation with Confucianism, the Harmonious Society did not become official Party 
canon, enshrined in the CCP’s charter, until the 17th National Congress in October 2007. The 
unifying concept of the Hu administration, Hu describes the Harmonious Society as one that 
“puts people first.”59 A shift from China’s primary focus on development to a more balanced, 
“Confucian-style” approach, it seeks to maintain economic growth while addressing social issues 
such as increasing income inequality, environmental degradation, and domestic political 
corruption.60 This propaganda theme emphasizes the Party’s benevolent concern for all Chinese 
citizens, their efforts to balance growth more evenly, and the implied price for this new socially 
responsible growth—loyalty to the CCP.61  
 Hu has also extended the Harmonious Society beyond domestic policy and into the 
international sphere with its foreign policy alter ego, China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi). A 
response to the “China threat theory,” the conviction in the West that China’s rise represents a 
threat to the international order, the term peaceful rise refers to China’s commitment to pursue 
“harmonious” and “peaceful” relations with its neighbors as it continues to develop. Peaceful rise 
was first introduced by Zheng Bijian, former vice president of the Central Party School and 
current Chairman of the China Reform Forum, at the Boao Forum in November of 2003. In his 
speech, Zheng described peaceful rise as China’s new strategic path: to continue to build 
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socialism with Chinese characteristics, while participating in rather than detaching from 
economic globalization.62 However, almost as soon as the term “peaceful rise” was introduced, 
some senior leaders and analysts expressed their concern about the use of the world of “rise.” 
Concerned that the talk about “rise” might further fuel Western fear of the “China threat,” it was 
decided to transition to a less loaded word. Thus, when President Hu Jintao delivered a speech in 
April 2004, again at the Boao Forum, he avoided any mention of “peaceful rise,” instead 
stressing China’s “peaceful development.”63 Since then, “peaceful development” has become the 
official slogan, though scholars and Western commentators have continued to use both “peaceful 
rise” and “peaceful development” almost interchangeably. 
 Despite the amount of ink the Chinese propaganda machine has dedicated to its promotion, 
it is difficult to further define exactly what “peaceful rise” entails beyond a few broad 
generalizations. Rather than a concrete policy program, it appears mostly to be a reassurance to 
the international community of China’s intentions. In this way, the discourse of “peaceful rise” 
seems to be mostly this—a discussion. The idea of peaceful rise is thus intended to send a 
message to China’s international observers: that China is moving into a new stage of 
development, that it is finally stepping out into the world, and that it is doing so in a confident—
but non-aggressive—manner.   
 What is it about Confucius that makes him so particularly suited to send this message? For 
one, the breadth of Confucian teachings makes the ancient sage a particularly convenient 
figurehead; remembered mostly for a large collection of disconnected proverbs, it is easy to pick 
and choose from a wide variety of teachings for practically any occasion—and equally 
important, easy for the Party to leave out what they would rather ignore. Confucianism is a 
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flexible philosophy, at least in its state-led incarnations, and has a long history of 
reinterpretation. Likewise, Confucianism was the ruling political ideology of China for centuries, 
long before Mao and the arrival of Marxism. Its legacy as the bulwark of Chinese imperialism 
means that the CCP can base their modern day appeal solidly in Chinese culture. Unlike 
Marxism, there is a cultural foundation for Confucianism in China, which give its ideas more 
staying power and added credibility, for both domestic and foreign audiences. Within China, 
Confucianism can provide the CCP with a kind of cultural legitimacy—an element missing from 
previous appeals to socialism and nationalism, both foreign imports—as well as the moral 
authority that the Party has lacked since the iron rice bowl was broken.64 Abroad, Confucianism 
serves to prioritize China’s ancient past over more controversial Communist history, glossing 
over painful memories from the Mao period with a colorful imperial palette. Confucius has thus 
come to replace Mao as China’s national mascot, the uncontested symbol of the greatness of 
Chinese civilization. In this way, the CCP hopes the Confucian revival will focus international 
attention on China’s cultural contributions to the world and emphasize its philosophy over its 
politics.  
 At a more basic level, though arguably the most important, the CCP hopes the revival of 
Confucius will break the association of brash irrationality produced by the angry complaints of 
popular nationalists. The personification of wisdom, judgment, and restraint, Confucius acts as 
the perfect foil to the angry youth and his revival can be understood as performance of China’s 
good qualities for an international audience. Through the invocation of Confucius in a series of 
conspicuous international events, institutions, and awards, the CCP thus seeks to present a vision 
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of a mature and responsible China to the world: one who can be trusted with the responsibly of a 
great power and to rise without making waves. 
 
Confucius rehabilitated 
 
Confucius in the 2008 Opening Ceremonies 
  
 Although the CCP has appealed to Confucian narratives increasingly since the early 
2000s, the Western mass media didn’t take serious notice of its propagandic repurposing until 
2008, when the new CCP spokesman was reintroduced to the West in style during the Beijing 
Olympic Games. The Harmonious Society was featured prominently in the official themes 
surrounding the Games, starting with the running of the Olympic Torch, christened the “Journey 
of Harmony.”65 Confucian themes were even more prominently featured in the opening 
ceremonies. Directed by Chinese filmmaker Zhang Yimou, the opening ceremonies emphasized 
the contributions of Chinese civilization throughout history, deemphasizing China’s communist 
history in favor of its cultural legacy. The ceremonies began with 2,008 drummers, beating 
electrically lit Fou drums and chanting a welcome from the Analects: “Friends have come from 
afar, how happy we are.”66 The second act of the artistic performance of the ceremonies, entitled 
“Beautiful Olympics,” echoed this message with a choir of 810 performers dressed as the 3000 
Disciples of Confucius, carrying bamboo scrolls inscribed with text from the Analects and 
chanting Confucian aphorisms: “Isn't it great to have friends coming from afar?” and “All men 
are brothers within the four seas.” They were followed by a fantastic display of rolling blocks 
representing the moveable type printing press, one of China’s great inventions, rising and falling 
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to music. The narration noted the resemblances to wind rolling across a field of grass, a reference 
to Confucius’ famous proverb on the virtue of rulers.67 The blocks then rearranged themselves to 
produce three variations of the character 和 (he), which means both “peace” and “harmony.”68 
Even Yimou’s nod to modern China prioritized the Party’s harmonious narrative, featuring a 
dove of peace constructed from the bodies of a thousand illuminated dancers.69  
 The Beijing Olympics are often spoken of as China’s “coming out party,” and in many 
ways they were. For China, the chance to host the Olympics represented both higher status in and 
greater respect from the international community, and so the Games were seized as an 
opportunity to present the face of the “new” China to the rest of the world—the fact that it chose 
a Confucian face is highly significant. The opening ceremonies deemphasized China’s 
Communist history in favor of the achievements of Chinese civilization. This selective 
interpretation of Chinese tradition, particularly the Confucian themes of harmony, brotherhood, 
and peace, was meant to put a kinder, gentler face on the PRC at a time where it faces enormous 
criticism from the international community on everything from human rights to trade policy. 
Ironically, the extravagant spectacle and militant precision of the opening ceremonies themselves 
were enough to incite fear among China Threat theorists—“Honey, are you having nightmares 
about the Chinese again?” However, the emphasis the opening ceremonies placed on China’s 
cultural contributions the world, its commitment to peace, and Confucian harmony represented a 
drastic departure from the blood and revolution of the Mao days.70  
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Confucius in the Classroom 
 
 Abroad, the rapid spread of “Confucius Institutes,” state-sponsored Chinese-language and 
culture centers, is by far the most visible foreign symbol of the Confucian revival. By the end of 
2010, there were a total of 322 “Confucius Institutes”71 and 369 “Confucius Classrooms”72 in 96 
different countries. In the United States, there are currently 73 Confucius Institutes and 51 
Confucius Classrooms, the most of any country.73 In 2009, over 260,000 registered students 
attended these institutes (a twofold increase from the previous year), and over 17,000 Chinese 
teachers and volunteers have reportedly been sent to Confucius Institutes between 2005 and early 
2011.74 
 The Confucius Institutes have become a key instrument of Chinese soft power abroad. 
China itself admits this: Li Changchun, China’s propaganda chief, has described the institutes as 
“an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup.”75 The CCP thus provides funding for 
Chinese studies abroad hoping to popularize them, making Chinese language and culture more 
attractive to the next generation of global decision makers. At the same time, by doing so under 
the banner of Confucius, it hopes to project a benign image of China within the international 
community to soften the impact of its rise. 
 However, the implications of these Confucius Institutes have raised eyebrows in higher 
education circles. The influx of Chinese government funding into classrooms abroad has come at 
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a crucial moment, allowing for a significant expansion of language and cultural programming 
despite budget cuts caused by the global recession. In spite of this, the presence of these 
institutes, particularly on university campuses, has raised concerns about academic freedom.76 
The Confucian Institutes are partnered with Chinese universities overseen by Hanban, a 
subsidiary of the Chinese Ministry of Education. Hanban provides yearly funding to host 
universities, pays the salaries and travel costs of Chinese teachers, and provides teaching 
materials.77 Critics complain that this relationship causes universities to self-censor themselves 
on sensitive issues, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Falun Gong, curtailing freedom of speech and 
constraining faculty research.78 If true, the “peacefulness” of these institutes may be 
questionable; it would certainly constitute a barb within China’s soft power projection. Still, the 
use of Confucius’ name to brand this effort is telling and reflects again the desire of the CCP to 
put a friendly face on its maneuverings abroad. The association of Confucius with harmony is 
thus intended to take the edge off any discomfiture felt by the Institutes’ foreign hosts, and the 
philosopher’s peaceful reputation is used as a guarantor of good Chinese intensions in the face of 
Western suspicion.   
 
The Confucius Peace Prize 
 
One of the Party’s most memorable—though perhaps the least successful—attempts to 
put a Confucian gloss on their public image is the “Confucius Peace Prize.” The controversial 
2010 Nobel nomination of Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo was met with anger and alarm by the 
CCP leadership. An outraged state press accused the Nobel committee of pandering to the 
Western, anti-China agenda, stating there is “reason to question whether the Nobel Peace Prize 
                                                
76 Redden, 2012 
77 Redden, 2012 
78 Redden, 2012 
Gary 33 
has been degraded to a political tool that serves an anti-China purpose. Instead of peace and 
unity in China, the Nobel committee would like to see the country split by an ideological rift, or 
better yet, collapse like the Soviet Union.”79 
In response to the nomination, China launched an “anti-Liu” public relations campaign, 
which included the creation of a competing award, the “Confucius Peace Prize.”80 While the 
identity of the ostensibly private nominating organization was never made clear, invitations to 
the award ceremony were sent by the Ministry of Culture, which falls under of the CCP Central 
Propaganda Department.81 The chairman of the organization explained that the goal of the prize 
was to reflect the Eastern vision of world peace, one influenced by Confucius.82 The first 
recipient was former Vice President of Taiwan and KMT Party Chairman Lien Chan, for his 
work “[building] a bridge of peace between the mainland and Taiwan.”83 Lien, however, did not 
attend the ceremony—the award was instead accepted on his behalf by an extremely 
uncomfortable looking 6-year-old girl—and when reached for comment, Lien denied every 
hearing of the Confucius Peace Prize.84 
In many ways, the Confucius Peace Prize did exactly the opposite of what was intended. 
Although clearly intended as a challenge to the Nobel Peace Prize, neither the international 
media nor the prize’s recipient took the Confucian alternative seriously. The dramatics 
surrounding its unveiling reinforced the image of China as childish, prompting ridicule and 
contempt from observers in the West. However, it does demonstrate the extent to which the Party 
relies on Confucianism when in need of an appealing image to project abroad. The brandishing 
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of Confucius name and image has become the kneejerk response to trouble with China’s national 
image, regardless of how inappropriate the association or how outrageous the cause.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While parts of the Confucian revival have certainly been performed for the benefit of a 
domestic audience, the most significant moments of the revival have all had an international 
orientation, projecting Confucian themes of harmony and peace abroad—the 2008 Olympic 
Games, the growth of Confucius Institutes, and the Confucian Peace Prize. Likewise, Confucius 
is invoked in each of these episodes to put a harmonious gloss on China’s growing power that 
will assuage fears abroad connected with China’s rise. By projecting a more benign image of 
China into the international community, embodied by the grandfatherly Confucius and the 
harmonious world order he is associated with, the CCP hopes to combat negative perceptions of 
China, largely created by the aggression of Chinese nationalists and the wild card they represent 
within Chinese foreign policy. The CCP depends on the nationalist legitimacy created during the 
1990s in order to maintain its hold on power; as such, it cannot stifle the agitation of China’s 
angry nationalists without risking Party leaders appearing unpatriotic themselves. Likewise, the 
Party must occasionally meet nationalists’ demands, even if these demands offend neighbors and 
upset the West. Basing its claim to continued party-rule as the guarantor of the nationalist goals 
of greatness and glory for China, the CCP dares not to give over this role to actors in civil society 
for fear of becoming irrelevant. Since the Party cannot curtail the expression of nationalists 
themselves, it attempts to manage the impact of these expressions instead. The large-scale 
rebranding of the People’s Republic in Confucian terms is the CCP’s answer to the China threat 
theory propagated in the West: its used as proof that the new Confucian China is a mature, 
cooperative, stable, and responsible world power. 
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The question remains, however: is the revival all rhetoric, or is there some substance 
behind it? Do we see a more harmonious, peaceful China rising to prominence, or is the positive 
image associated with Confucius being used to mask malicious intentions? It is difficult to say, 
partly because Communist Party cadres may not yet know themselves. The tenuous balance that 
exists between China’s aggrieved nationalists and the party-state that is forced to represent their 
interests makes it almost impossible to divine whether the motives for the Confucian revival are 
“genuine,” if there is such a thing. Chinese leaders may sincerely desire a peaceful rise for 
China, but so long as its legitimacy remains grounded in nationalism, the CCP must continue to 
deliver victories in the name of Chinese national greatness or risk being perceived as weak by 
China’s rabid popular nationalists.  
 Regardless of whether we understand China as a peaceful power, the Confucian revival is 
decidedly lacking in Confucian values. Revivalists use the historical Confucius as a symbol of 
traditional culture, and as an ambassador of the new, peaceful China, while either grossly 
oversimplifying or completely ignoring his teachings. The “Confucian” element of Chinese 
foreign policy is thus essentially contentless; the Confucian revival is an attempt to put a 
Confucian “gloss” on China’s image abroad and calm the fears of Western observers over 
China’s rise.  
However, this selective interpretation of particular themes, such as harmony, while 
ignoring others, like the Confucian concept of the ethical and transparent rulership, is a 
contradiction that has been noted. Party ideologues should take care to remember Mencius, one 
of the most famous neo-Confucian philosophers: a ruler retains the authority to rule only so long 
as he retains the mandate from heaven, which depends on his virtue. A king without generosity, 
self-sacrifice, humility, receptiveness to instruction, or responsiveness to the needs of his 
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subjects is not a king at all. When asked about the regicide of the King of Zhou, Mencius 
responded, “Someone who does violence to the good we call a villain; someone who does 
violence to the right we call a criminal. A person who is both a villain and a criminal we call a 
scoundrel. I have heard that the scoundrel Zhou was killed, but have not heard that a lord was 
killed.”85 Mencius makes it clear: those who lose the moral authority of rulership have lost the 
right to rule. By invoking Confucius in the political sphere once again, the CCP dredges up old 
expectations of the ethical imperatives of benevolent rule. It is difficult to break the association 
between Confucianism and the mandate of heaven, and by using Confucius as the new stand-in 
for contemporary Chinese culture, the party-state draws attention to and invites an evaluation of 
their performance—and opens the door to possible regime challenge should the perception rise 
that the mandate of heaven has been lost.  
Finally, we might question the wisdom of this latest attempt at cultural engineering. Party 
leaders continues to believe they can create and guide mass movements to solve problems, 
manipulating readily recognizable cultural mores for political ends, but if we look to the past this 
is not proven. These attempts usually have unforeseen consequences—like the nationalism 
engineered in the 1990s in response to the political fatigue following the excesses of revolution 
and the failure of socialism. Now, in the 2000s, we see the Party trying again, responding to the 
failures of a mass movement with yet another mass movement. Why should the CCP’s attempts 
be any more successful this time around? Such state-engineered movements have proven both to 
be disingenuous, thus unable to pass ideological muster, and very difficult to control. In the same 
way that the state-led nationalism has veered out of control in recent years, causing the Party 
arguably more problems that it solved—including much of the negative press that is currently 
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forcing China to rebrand—so too could state-led Confucianism. Only time will tell what pitfalls 
lie hidden for the new Confucian China, but Party leaders should look to the past for caution and 
know that they revive Confucius, and the accompanying baggage, at their own risk. 
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